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1. INTRODUCTION 
Under the effects of economic globalisation and the internet, international trade 
in traditional knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural expressions (TCE) is gaining 
magnitude and a debate about the law’s role in protecting indigenous cultural 
heritage (ICH)1 seems more necessary than ever. So far, the dominant attitude in this 
debate has been a defensive one. Scholars backed by prominent indigenous brokers 
have been arguing for some decades that the international legal order should work 
out efficient defences against flagrant misappropriation of ICH. The international 
restitution of stolen or illegally exported indigenous cultural property indeed leaves 
a lot to be desired and the existing intellectual property (IP) regime does not provide 
effective remedies against misappropriation of TK and TCE. 2  Although these 
concerns need to be addressed,3 I think that the debate should not stop there. Instead, 
I suggest a shift from a defensive attitude to a proactive strategy and to study 
whether international trade in ICH could promote social and economic development 
of indigenous peoples and how the law could contribute to this aim. 
The concept of “development” is understood here in line with Amartya Sen’s 
seminal book “Development as Freedom” and “[a]ttention is thus paid particularly 
to the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – 
and have reason to value.”4 Sen has made it clear that this philosophical concept 
should not be limited to the poor people in developing countries since “the richer 
countries too often have deeply disadvantaged people, who lack basic 
opportunities”.5 This is certainly also true for indigenous peoples who often belong 
to the most disadvantaged segments of society. Accordingly, there is good reason to 
assume in this chapter, that the concept “development as freedom” can also be 
extended mutatis mutandis to the indigenous peoples in rich countries, including the 
USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. 
Adopting the view that a more active participation of indigenous peoples in the 
trade of their knowledge assets would promote their social and economic 
development raises difficult questions of legitimacy and method.  
Questions of legitimacy will be posed by the potentially modernising effects of 
development endangering traditional ways of indigenous peoples’ social 
                                                        
1  Whereas TK, TCE (sometimes also called “Folklore”), biological and genetic resources or indigenous 
cultural and intellectual property (ICIP) are among the many terms that are used to describe the subject 
matter, indigenous peoples often prefer to speak of indigenous cultural heritage (ICH). Whereas most of the 
above mentioned terms reflect the ways in which modern law categorises indigenous knowledge assets 
and thus subjects indigenous culture under a modern episteme, indigenous cultural heritage respects 
indigenous peoples’ epistemological sovereignty. Accordingly, the latter term is used in this chapter. 
2  This is because the IP system leaves many modes of TK and TCE outside the scope of protection. 
3  See in particular Rebecca Tsosie, ‘International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: An Argument for 
Indigenous Governance of Cultural Property’, in this volume; Rosemary J. Coombe and Joseph F. Turcotte, 
‘Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and Trade: Perspectives from the Dynamics of Cultural 
Heritage Law and Policy’, in this volume; Christoph Antons, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Indigenous 
Cultural Heritage: Basic Concepts and Continuing Controversies’, in this volume; Brigitte Vézina, ‘Are 
They In or Are They Out? Traditional Cultural Expressions and the Public Domain: Implications for Trade’, 
in this volume; and Martin Girsberger and Benny Müller, ‘International Trade in Indigenous Cultural 
Heritage: An IP Practioners’ Perspective’, in this volume. 
4  Amartya K. Sen, Development as Freedom, 1st edn, New York: Anchor Books, 2000, at p. 18. 
5  Ibid., at p. 15. “Even within very rich countries, sometimes the longevity of substantial groups is no higher 
than that in much poorer economies of the so-called third world.” 
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organisation. For Sen, it is “the people directly involved who must have the 
opportunity in deciding what should be chosen” if a traditional way of life must be 
given up because of modernising effects entailed by development.6 This chapter will 
further elaborate on some difficult problems that must be resolved when such an 
approach is followed in a legal context including conflicts between rights of the 
group with rights of individual members of the group. 
Questions of method arise when studying how international law, including 
international economic law, could better contribute to furthering development 
interests of indigenous peoples in the trade of ICH.7 There will be many areas where 
modern8 law and indigenous custom collide. As the indigenous sociologist Duane 
Champagne argued, any effort to draft better legal solutions will be challenged by 
unbridgeable differences between indigenous and non-indigenous worldviews.9  
From an epistemological perspective, the difference between indigenous and 
non-indigenous worldviews implies that in our scientific aspirations of gaining 
knowledge we are ultimately always stopped at a point where a veil covers what 
cannot be accessed by a modern mind. What are the consequences of this insight for 
our research? A first consequence is simply to be conscious that this difference exists 
and that it cannot be negotiated. From this follows the second consequence. If access 
to the core of the indigenous world is not possible for a non-indigenous mind, then 
the question is how we, as (modern) lawyers and social scientists, should 
methodologically deal with the impossibility of looking behind the veil.  
The response that this research project has given to the problem is twofold. 
Following an approach of transdisciplinary research, we have first been very careful to 
include indigenous scholars and stakeholders into all steps of the research process. 
According to one definition, a key element of transdisciplinarity consists in 
participatory research, i.e. the inclusion of the most relevant stakeholders into the 
research process. 10  In line with this exigency of transdisciplinarity, the active 
participation of indigenous scholars and stakeholders shall prevent the research 
project from falling into the traps of scientific colonialism or paternalism. However, a 
word of caution is necessary to avoid exaggerated expectations. As for any one group 
of researchers or projects we must acknowledge that such an approach sets practical 
difficulties on what can be accomplished. In particular, one must bear in mind that 
indigenous persons designated as “experts” for indigenous worldviews by non-
indigenous systems of recognition enter a dual world which potentially distances 
them from indigenous peoples living traditional lives.11 Second, we suggest relying 
on procedural approaches rather than on substantive solutions when dealing with 
indigenous issues in law and policymaking. The basic features of such a procedural 
approach shall be explored in this chapter. 
After considering the problems related to legitimacy and method, the chapter 
will turn to issues related to the international law’s potential in stimulating ICH 
                                                        
6  Ibid., at p. 31. 
7  The concepts “traditional” as opposed to “modern” culture are used in this chapter in a strictly sociological 
sense and do not entail any value judgements. 
8  Terms like “modern” (as opposed to “traditional” or “indigenous’) or “modernisation” are used 
throughout this chapter in a sociological sense to distinguish patterns of social organisation and do not 
entail any value judgments. Hence, I am by no means saying that a “modern” social structure should 
anyhow be preferred over a traditional or indigenous one. 
9  See Duane Champagne, ‘Indigenous Self-Government, Cultural Heritage and International Trade: A 
Sociological Perspective’, in this volume. 
10  Christian Pohl and Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn, Principles for Designing Transdisciplinary Research, Munich: 
oekom, 2007, at pp. 70-72. 
11  I would like to thank Peter Drahos for pointing this out. 
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trade for the sake of indigenous social and economic development. To this end it first 
assesses how interests of indigenous peoples in trade and development of ICH are 
currently institutionalised in international economic law. 12  Second, the chapter 
examines whether preferential trade rules for indigenous cultural goods and services 
would be an adequate tool to advance the interests of indigenous peoples in ICH 
trade and development.  
2.  DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Indigenous peoples appear generally at the lower end of socioeconomic statistics 
and even in first world countries they belong to the most disadvantaged groups in 
many respects, including life expectancy, income, education etc. 13  From this 
perspective, a policy contributing to improving their social and economic 
development seems to be persuasive. However, critics have objected that 
development may have harmful effects and even destroy traditions and cultural 
heritage of indigenous peoples.14 Based on Amartya Sen’s concept of “development 
as freedom”, it is possible to respond to this objection in two tiers. First, it must be 
recalled that for Sen, development is viewed as an “expansion of freedom” 15 and 
attention is thus given more to the end of development than to its means. 
Accordingly, the contributions of development to the growth of personal capabilities 
are more important than its contributions to economic growth. Similarly, the primary 
significance of the market is seen in its participatory dimension as an institution 
enabling freedom of interchange.16 If the freedom aspect of the market is emphasised, 
the focus should not be on utilities, incomes or wealth (the “culmination outcomes” 
of the market) but rather on “the process of getting there, including the exercise of 
freedom”. 17  The second element of the objection relates to the potentially 
modernising effect of development involving the destruction of traditions and 
cultural heritage. Sen concedes that it would not be sufficient to dismiss this 
objection with the argument “that it is better to be rich and happy than to be 
impoverished and traditional”.18 Such an argument would fall short of considering 
that the authority and legitimacy of such a decision is problematic. As stated by Sen: 
“There is an inescapable valuational problem involved in deciding what to choose in 
and when it turns out that some parts of tradition cannot be maintained along with 
economic or social changes that may be needed for other reasons.”19 
                                                        
12  The term “international economic law” is understood broadly to encompass also trade-related legal 
aspects of intellectual property, cultural property and tangible and intangible cultural heritage. 
13  For the situation in the US see the comprehensive, systematic and comparative study of social, economic 
and political conditions of American Indian reservations, undertaken by the Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development over the last 20 years: Eric C. Henson et al. (eds), The State of the Native 
Nations. Conditions under U.S. Policies of Self-determination, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
14  For a generally defensive posture towards participation of indigenous peoples in international trade, see, 
e.g. Champagne, supra note 9, and the discussion in Fiona Macmillan, ‘Finding Space in the Margins? 
Recognising the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the WTO’, in this volume. See also Robert K. Paterson and 
Dennis S. Karjala, ‘Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples’ (2003) Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 11, pp. 633-670, 
at p. 634. 
15  Sen, supra note 4, at p. 36. 
16  Ibid., at p. 6. 
17  Ibid., at p. 27. 
18  Ibid., at p. 31. 
19  Ibid. 
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The answer Sen offers to resolve the identified problem is participation. Choosing 
about its destiny is a decision that only a people directly involved can legitimately 
take. If it is up to the people involved to choose, it is necessary that it receives “the 
opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen”. 20  From a legal 
perspective, one may easily agree to such a precept since allowing an (indigenous) 
people to decide freely on what traditions to follow is part of its collective right of 
self-determination and self-government as recognised by the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).21 Although the UNDRIP is not a binding 
instrument of public international law,22 it is relevant as a political tool and will most 
likely influence future law and policymaking on indigenous issues at all levels.23  
For Sen, the real philosophical quandary is the question whether participation 
should also be a precept within a traditional people or group. 24  Ultimately, the 
problem is the relationship between the rights of the group and the rights of 
individual members of the group. This is a frequent conflict situation in indigenous 
contexts.25 Here the question arises whether and, if yes, to what extent an indigenous 
group can internally enforce its traditional custom against dissenting individual 
members of the group. What should be the normative reference for deciding this 
question? Should it be indigenous custom or should it be modern law? Sen does not 
discuss this question in detail. However, the examples he provides as an illustration 
of his general argument clearly show that he would opt for the participatory freedom 
of the individual within the group and, in a case of conflict, against the customary 
rules of the traditional group or people. Sen argues: 26 
An attempt to choke off [internal] participatory freedom on grounds of traditional 
values (such as religious fundamentalism, or political custom, or the so-called Asian 
values) simply misses the issue of legitimacy and the need for the people to 
participate in deciding what they want and what they have reason to accept.  
                                                        
20  Ibid. 
21  UN, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), GA Res. 61/295 (UN Doc. A/61/L.67 and 
Add.1) (adopted on 13 September 2007), Articles 3 and 5, protecting the right of (collective) self-
determination and the right of collective self-government, respectively. 
22  On the controversy regarding the reach and impact of the right of self-determination in international law, 
see Daniel Thürer and Thomas Burri, ‘Self-Determination’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, available online at 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/-epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e873&recno=2&searchType=Quick&query=Thomas+Burri (all online sources were accessed 7 September 
2011). See also Christoph B. Graber, ‘Aboriginal Self-Determination vs the Propertisation of Traditional 
Culture: The Case of Sacred Wanjina Sites’ (2009) Australian Indigenous Law Review, 13 (2), pp. 18–34, at p. 
26 [hereinafter Graber, ‘Aboriginal Self-Determination’]; and Jessica C. Lai, ‘The Protection of Māori 
Cultural Heritage Post-Endorsement of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 
University of Lucerne, Switzerland, i-call Working Paper No. 2 (2011), at pp. 8-34, available online at 
http://www.unilu.ch/files/i-call_Working_Paper_2011_02_Lai_Maori_Cultural_Heritage__UNDRIP.pdf 
[hereinafter Lai, ‘Māori Cultural Heritage and UNDRIP’]. 
23  The Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007. One hundred and forty-
three UN Member States voted in favour, 11 abstained and four – Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States – voted against the instrument. Since its adoption, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
United States have all reversed their positions and now endorse the Declaration. Colombia and Samoa 
have also indicated their support for the Declaration. For an account of the relevance of the UNDRIP as a 
political tool see Lai, ‘Māori Cultural Heritage and UNDRIP’, supra note 22, at pp. 26-30. 
24  Sen, supra note 4, at p. 32. 
25  For examples of US Law see Carole Goldberg, ‘A United States Perspective on Protection of Indigenous 
Cultural Heritage’, in this volume. 
26  Sen, supra note 4, at p. 32. 
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The consequence of a normative requirement for internal participation would be 
that individual members of the group could not legitimately be required to obey to 
traditional custom based decisions of the group. This is only consequent if 
considering Sen’s general emphasis on the pre-eminence of democratic structures.27 
However, from a legal perspective it would be necessary to introduce a distinction 
between indigenous and non-indigenous groups.28 This is indispensable because the 
collective right of self-determination and self-government of indigenous peoples is 
specifically protected under the UNDRIP.29 Affirming an unlimited and unspecified 
right of internal participation would thus ignore collective rights of indigenous 
peoples. On the other hand, an absolute rejection of modernity would risk violating 
human rights of individual members of the indigenous group or people. In certain 
cases of cultural or ritual practices of indigenous peoples (including honour killing, 
female circumcision or spearing and other physical punishment)30 the primacy of 
indigenous customary law would indeed create conflicts with core human rights 
standards (ius cogens) and international ordre public. Fortunately, the UNDRIP itself 
provides for a solution to such collisions between indigenous custom and modern 
law. According to Article 34 UNDRIP, indigenous peoples must respect international 
human rights standards when making use of the “right to promote, develop and 
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, 
traditions, procedures, practices”. 
According to Sen, native cultures cannot escape from effects of the globalising 
world, even if they are harmful.31 Because the forces of global exchange and trade are 
difficult to resist in a world dominated by modern information and communication 
technologies the option to stop globalisation is arguably not available for local 
cultures.32 In my view, however, it would be oversimplifying to see participation in a 
capitalist economy or the use of modern communication technologies as solely a 
threat to local identities. The internet, in particular, may help indigenous 
communities to overcome isolation. It has indeed become extremely valuable for 
people living in remote areas for purposes like schooling or telemedicine.33 Moreover, 
the internet may provide a useful tool to communicate with like-minded groups 
around the world and to build coalitions, particularly in international and regional 
policymaking. It may also offer new opportunities to communities which want to 
take advantage of economic globalisation, enter trade relations and gradually move 
                                                        
27  Ibid., at pp. 146-159. 
28  Sen addresses conflicts between traditional and modern worldviews in general without discussing 
indigenous issues in particular. 
29  For the legal protection of the collective rights of self-determination and self-government of indigenous 
peoples under the UNDRIP see supra note 22, and accompanying text. For a philosophical defence of the 
argument that indigenous communities must be able to live according to their cultural practice see 
Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), Multicultural Citizenship: A 
Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 228-256. Kukathas conceives the right 
of the individual to leave the community to be crucial. For a discussion of this argument from a human 
rights perspective see Christoph B. Graber, ‘Using Human Rights to Tackle Fragmentation in the Field of 
Traditional Cultural Expressions: An Institutional Approach’, in Christoph B. Graber and Mira Burri-
Nenova (eds), Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Digital Environment, Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 96-120, at pp. 114-118. 
30  On spearing as an Aboriginal form of punishment, see Heather McRae et al., Indigenous Legal Issues, 
Commentary and Materials, 3rd edn, Sydney: Thomson, 2003, at pp. 549–551. 
31  Sen, supra note 4, at p. 32. 
32  Ibid., at p. 240. 
33  See Kyra Landzelius (ed.), Native on the Net: Indigenous and Diasporic Peoples in the Virtual Age, London and 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
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towards more modern forms of social organisation.34 If an indigenous community 
incrementally shifts from tradition to modernity, it may however want to open up 
only certain aspects of its lifeworld (Husserl), while sticking to traditions with regard 
to spirituality and religious beliefs. Generally, indigenous groups will not be able 
and not want to respond to dramatic increases in demand for their products. Small 
really is beautiful for many indigenous groups.35 
The differences in the social institutionalisation of creativity (and innovation) in 
traditional and modern societies have been elaborated elsewhere. 36  They are 
responsible for many shortcomings of international law to adequately protect 
indigenous knowledge assets against misappropriation. Providing remedies against 
misappropriation or misuse is thus a prerequisite for trade in ICH being able to 
support indigenous development. In addition, free prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
and benefit-sharing must be respected. FPIC is crucial, since indigenous peoples will 
be willing to produce certain artwork for commercial sale but will want to keep their 
sacred knowledge secret and to prevent its unauthorised disclosure and subsequent 
use.37 Thus, in accordance with their traditions, they will insist that sacred and secret 
artefacts must be kept off the art market.  
A further complication is legal certainty. From the perspective of the market, a 
prerequisite for trade in indigenous heritage would certainly be that third-party 
users know what TCE and TK may or may not be (appropriately) bought or 
otherwise used.38 Accordingly, definitions of TK and TCE and a determination of 
what subject matter can be traded seem to be necessary for the purpose of legal 
certainty. The question is who should provide for the required definitions and 
determinations. Should it be international treaty law? In my view, international law 
should abstain from providing substantive definitions of, inter alia, TK and TCE 
(including its tradability) since this would otherwise result in a subjugation of 
indigenous culture under modern legal concepts. As I have emphasised elsewhere, 
expressions of indigenous creativity strongly depend on the geographical, spiritual 
                                                        
34  For comprehensive analyses see Miriam Sahlfeld, ‘Commercializing Cultural Heritage? Criteria for a 
Balanced Instrumentalization of Traditional Cultural Expressions for Development in a Globalized Digital 
Environment’, in Christoph B. Graber and Mira Burri-Nenova (eds), Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Cultural Expressions in a Digital Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 256–286, and, 
pointing to differences in the reception of modernity between indigenous cultures in Australia and 
Southeast Asia, Christoph Antons, ‘Traditional Cultural Expressions and their Significance for 
Development in a Digital Environment: Examples from Australia and Southeast Asia’, in Christoph B. 
Graber and Mira Burri-Nenova (eds), Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Digital 
Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 287–301. 
35  My thanks to Peter Drahos for this suggestion. 
36  For differences in the institutionalisation of creativity see Christoph B. Graber, ‘Institutionalization of 
Creativity in Traditional Societies and in International Trade Law’, in Shubha Ghosh and Robin P. Malloy 
(eds), Creativity, Law and Entrepreneurship, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 234–263 [hereinafter 
Graber, ‘Institutionalization of Creativity’]. For differences in the institutionalisation of innovation, see 
Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Cannibalizing Epistemes: Will Modern Law Protect 
Traditional Cultural Expressions?’, in Christoph B. Graber and Mira Burri-Nenova (eds), Intellectual 
Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Digital Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, 
pp. 17–45. 
37  See Antony Taubman, ‘Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential Diversity in the International 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge’, in Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (eds), International 
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 521–564, at p. 534. 
38  Susy Frankel, ‘Trademarks, Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Intellectual Property’, in Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis (eds), Trademark Law and Theory. A Handbook of Contemporary Research, 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 433–463, at p. 448 [hereinafter Frankel, ‘TMs, TK and CIP’]. 
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and social context of their production.39 Since “the framework requirements of the 
respective local culture have to be maintained”,40 it will be important to capture not 
only the result, but also the whole process of TK and TCE production. Consequently, 
international law should provide for procedural solutions rather than substantive 
ones. That is, rather than itself defining TCE and TK, international law should limit 
its jurisdiction to stating who is responsible to do this. I will discuss problems posed 
by such a procedural approach in more detail in the next section. 
3. INTERFACING INDIGENOUS AND MODERN WORLDVIEWS: 
A PROCEDURAL APPROACH 
As outlined above, the silver bullet to resolving problems of legitimacy in trade 
and development of ICH seems to be participation of indigenous holders of TK and 
TCE and a procedural approach to interfacing indigenous and non-indigenous 
worldviews. However, it needs to be clarified what participation would mean in a 
context of international trade and what kind of procedures would assure a fair trade-
off between interests of indigenous holders of TK and TCE and interests of non-
indigenous customers.  
In a first step, I will clarify the concept of a “procedural approach” in general 
before exploring its concrete meaning in contexts of trade in ICH. The discussions on 
proceduralist approaches in the field of social theory generally distinguish the 
concepts of procedural law and procedural justice. 
3.1 PROCEDURALIST THINKING IN SOCIAL THEORY 
The term procedural law is used by law and society theorists to describe a form 
of legal rationality. 41  The point is, that procedural law is characterised by a 
procedural form of rationality as opposed to “substantive” legal rationality. Whereas 
“substantive” law is concerned with results, procedural law – which is sometimes 
also referred to as “reflexive law”42 – is characterised by process-orientation in the 
design of institutional structures and in organising participation in decision-
making.43  
In contrast, the term “procedural justice” is used to value the legitimacy44 and/or 
legitimation 45 of outcomes that are arrived at through the observance of certain 
procedures. Procedural justice has been a concern for authors writing in the field of 
social psychology as well as in philosophy of the law. Within a social psychology 
context “procedural justice” has been defined by Tom Tyler as the willingness of 
                                                        
39  For Aboriginal culture in Australia the concept of “totemic polygon” has been introduced to describe the 
complex discursive relationship between the spiritual ancestors, the land, totemic custom and the 
traditional artist. For more information see Christoph B. Graber, ‘Can Modern Law Safeguard Archaic 
Cultural Expressions? Observations From a Legal Sociology Perspective’, in Christoph Antons (ed.), 
Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Intellectual Property Law in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009, pp. 159–176 [hereinafter Graber, ‘Modern Law and CEs’]. 
40  Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, supra note 36, at p. 41. 
41  Gralf-Peter Calliess, Prozedurales Recht, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999. 
42  Gunther Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) Law and Society Review, 17, 
pp. 239-285, at pp. 266-285. 
43  Ibid., at p. 257. 
44  Legitimacy is the technical term used by social-psychology writers. 
45  Legitimation is the technical term used by philosophy of law authors. 
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legal subjects “to accept outcomes that are arrived at through procedures that are 
viewed as being fair”.46 Whereas this definition is looking at the quality of outputs 
from an empirical perspective of individual acceptance (legitimacy), legal philosophy 
(in the tradition of critical theory) is more interested in normative criteria of 
legitimation. Indeed, Jürgen Habermas and his school would consider legitimate 
outcomes to be those that have been obtained through procedures respecting a 
normative standard of institutional structure and participation. 47  Habermas has 
championed a proceduralist paradigm of law as the only available model, after both 
the liberal paradigm and the social-welfare paradigm have lost their persuasive 
power.48 Under the proceduralist paradigm, the law is neither exclusively oriented to 
securing an equal distribution of rights (the liberal paradigm) nor understood as an 
instrument for maximising distributive justice (the social-welfare paradigm), but 
rather conceived as a framework guarantee for process-based rules of fair 
communication – as detailed in Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy.49 
Habermas’ reference to a proceduralist paradigm of law suggests that there are 
more commonalities than differences in the discussed approaches to phenomena of 
procedure, law and justice. The points of convergence of both procedural law and 
procedural justice writings are that they all refer to a process-based model of 
regulation (rather than an outcome-based model) and that assuring the participation of 
stakeholders is considered to be a key requirement. 50  As a consequence, when 
speaking of a procedural approach in the remainder of this chapter, I essentially refer 
to a process-based model of regulation where the participation of the most relevant 
stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, is a central element. 
Social theorist’s accentuation of stakeholder participation clearly resonates in 
more recent UN law and policymaking in the field of indigenous issues. Since the 
early 1970s, UN institutions have acknowledged “that the greater the participation 
by indigenous peoples in an institutional process, the more legitimate are the process 
and its results”.51 Whereas earlier research feared that an emphasis on procedural 
solutions and participation mainly served as a “disempowering shift from 
substantive political goals”52 (while calling self-determination a substantive goal), the 
adoption of the UNDRIP made this argument groundless. Indeed, as some authors 
have argued more recently, the adoption of the UNDRIP has underscored the 
importance of indigenous participation as an axiom of law and policymaking to be 
respected not only in relations between states but also at the domestic level.53 
                                                        
46  Tom R. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) Crime and Justice, 30, 
pp. 283-357, at p. 292. 
47  At the level of national law such standards will be set by the constitution and will vary according to the 
nature of the legal or administrative procedure at issue. 
48  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
translation by William Regh, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, at pp. 409-410. 
49  Ibid., at pp. 418-419; see also Axel Tschentscher, Prozedurale Theorien der Gerechtigkeit. Rationales Entscheiden, 
Diskursethik und prozedurales Recht, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000, at p. 246. 
50  There is, however, an important difference in the normative assumptions of the two concepts. Whereas 
Habermas’ concept of “procedural justice” ultimately serves the purpose of “democratisation”, the concept 
of procedural law is not bound by a particular normative a priori. When applied to developing procedures 
for interfacing indigenous culture and modern law insistence on democratic institutional structures in 
indigenous communities is often not an option. 
51  Chris Tennant, ‘Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 
1945-1993’ (1994) Human Rights Quarterly, 16 (1), pp. 1–57, at p. 49-52. 
52  Ibid., at p. 56. 
53  Claire Charters, ‘A Self-Determination Approach to Justifying Indigenous Peoples’ Participation in 
International Law and Policy Making’ (2010) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 17, pp. 215–
240, at pp. 230-232. See also Stephen Allen, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
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To conclude, various strands of social and legal theory view a procedural 
approach to be more effective than creating substantive rules. 54  This conclusion 
extends to resolving problems related to interfacing modern law and local traditions. 
Indeed, as several socio-psychological studies demonstrate, fair procedures enhance 
the readiness to accept results, decisions or sentences as being just throughout 
different groups and cultures.55 
3.2 A PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO TRADE IN ICH 
How could a procedural approach be implemented in situations where a decision 
must be taken about who can legitimately decide whether an asset of indigenous 
culture can be traded or must be treated as res extra commercium because of its sacred 
or otherwise important meaning for the community? Here, interests of traditional 
culture and interests of the global market will often be difficult to reconcile. Whereas 
an indigenous group as holder of TK or TCE will primarily be interested in free prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) when deciding about the tradability of a knowledge 
asset, the primary interest of the market is legal certainty.  
In practice, three types of disputes concerning control/ownership over or of a TK 
or TCE are most likely: 
1. dispute between an indigenous community and a non-indigenous third 
party;  
2. dispute between an indigenous community and one of its individual 
members; 
3. dispute between two indigenous communities. 
In all three cases the first and central problem requiring clarification is the 
definition of the indigenous community that can legitimately assert control or 
property rights in a knowledge asset. There exists no legally binding definition of 
“indigenous peoples” at the international level.56 The most often cited definition 
stems from José R. Martinez Cobo, as the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and is contained in 
addendum 4 of a seminal report that he prepared in 1986-87. 57  Paragraph 379 
provides: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Limits of the International Legal Project’, in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2011, Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
pp. 225–256, at pp. 250-253, discussing indigenous peoples’ interests in national and international law from 
the perspective of Habermas’ work on communicative ethics. 
54  Similarly, Taubman, supra note 37, at p. 530, considers establishing alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to be more effective than creating new IP rights to assure effective protection of indigenous 
cultural knowledge. 
55  Günter Bierbrauer and Edgar Klinger, ‘Verfahrensgerechtigkeit/Procedural Justice’, in Renate Volbert and 
Max Steller (eds), Handbuch der Rechtspsychologie, Göttingen et al.: Hogrefe, 2008, pp. 507–518; and Tom R. 
Tyler, Social Justice in a Diverse Society, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 75–102. 
56  John Scott and Federico Lenzerini, ‘International Indigenous and Human Rights Law in the Context of 
Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage’, in this volume. 
57  UN, José R. Martinez Cobo, ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations’, (UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add. 1-4, 1986). 
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generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
With regard to historical continuity, paragraph 380 requires an extended period 
of time reaching into the present of one or more of several factors, including 
occupation of ancestral lands, common ancestry with the original occupants of these 
lands, social organisation, language etc. 
In line with this definition and with a view to provide practical guidance, Erica-
Irene Daes, chair of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations from 1984 to 
2001 and initial drafter of the UNDRIP, suggested that four criteria should be 
examined in order to establish whether there is an indigenous community or group. 
These include: 58   
1. a community’s priority in time with regard to the occupation and use of a 
territory,  
2. aspects of language and social organisation,  
3. self-identification as well as self-recognition by other groups, and 
4. experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or 
discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist.  
Whereas it will be generally sufficient to rely on the self-identification of a group 
as indigenous, a clarification would be necessary, if control that a group derives from 
its indigenous identity is disputed by an indigenous or non-indigenous third-party. 
If we start with the scenario where the third party involved is non-indigenous, the 
question needs to be clarified how indigenous laws and customs and modern law 
should interface. Should this collision of laws be resolved within a framework of 
indigenous laws and customs or within a framework of modern law?  
In Australia, where such questions arise regularly in the realm of Aboriginal land 
claim cases, it is modern Australian law that formulates the “interface rule”. 
According to Australian case law, an Aboriginal people putting forward a native title 
claim is required to prove: 59 
1. the existence of a distinct community;  
2. a traditional connection with or occupation of the land at issue under the 
laws and customs of the group; and  
3. the maintenance of this connection.  
Aboriginal claimants bringing a native title case before a court have thus to 
accept that their claim is squeezed into the doctrinal frame of native title that is 
provided by Australian common law. For the claimants, the unavoidable 
consequence of this “choice” of modern law as the framework for resolving such a 
dispute is losing epistemological sovereignty since indigenous laws and customs are 
subjugated under the categories imposed by Australian common law.60 To illustrate a 
                                                        
58  Erica-Irene Daes (Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations), ‘The 
Concept of “Indigenous Peoples”’ (1997) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter, 2(1), pp. 162−174, at p. 173. 
59  Lisa Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases Since Mabo, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 
2006, at p. 13. 
60  From an Aboriginal perspective, the problem of native title is its logical inconsistency. Although the source 
of native title is not the common law but the traditional laws and customs, the assumption that sovereignty 
was acquired by the Crown at the moment of British settlement is not questioned. If constructed 
consistently, native title would require recognition of “a form of sovereignty” of the colonised people. In 
reality, however, the law of the traditional inhabitants is subjugated under the law of the colonisers and 
treated as an element of fact, not law. For a detailed discussion and references see Graber, ‘Aboriginal Self-
Determination’, supra note 22, at p. 28. For an analysis of similar logical inconsistencies existing in US law, 
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consequence of this, it is sufficient to point to difficulties that Aborigines have been 
facing in the procedure of taking evidence. In earlier years, affidavits of Aboriginal 
witnesses were excluded by Australian judges as a means to prove links with their 
land arguably because they are mere “hearsay”; statements of anthropologists, 
however, were recognised as evidence.61 The situation has improved more recently 
in land rights disputes where Aboriginal evidence is now generally combined with 
anthropologist’s evidence. 62 Nonetheless, observers have noted “that most of the 
leading native title and heritage protection judgements devote considerably more 
space to the evidence of anthropologists, historians and archaeologists than the 
evidence of Aborigines”.63 
In contrast, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA) of the United States is an example demonstrating a greater 
responsiveness of modern law vis-à-vis indigenous custom. The primary purpose of 
NAGPRA is to resolve conflicts related to the allocation of old or newly excavated 
human remains, funerary objects, cultural objects etc. of claimed indigenous 
ownership.64 The law of evidence provided by the NAGPRA framework does not 
require an indigenous community to present sharp-edged proof meeting modern 
scientific standards, but accepts several soft forms of proof, including stories told by 
indigenous witnesses to show a cultural affiliation with a claimed object.65 Although it 
is still modern law setting the standard for NAGPRA cases, the subordination of 
indigenous custom under modern law is cushioned by procedural flexibility towards 
indigenous social practices. 
The second type of disputes, i.e. disputes between an indigenous community and 
one of its (former) individual members, includes conflicts between traditional rights 
of the community and individual rights of a group member who does not anymore 
fully identify with the values of the group. This is a type of conflict that may arise 
because indigenous culture cannot be immunised against modernisation and it may 
happen that an individual (indigenous) artist will drift from tribal to modern 
patterns of artistic expression, due to greater exposure to the global art system.66 
Such a “modernised” artist may also want to commercialise his or her creations by 
making use of the protection afforded by modern IP law although he or she may 
                                                                                                                                                       
see Mark Rifkin, ‘Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of 
Native Peoples‘ (2009) Cultural Critique, 72, pp. 88–124. 
61  For an analysis see Christoph Antons, ‘Folklore Protection in Australia: Who is Expert in Aboriginal 
Tradition?’, in Elke Kurz-Milcke and Gerd Gigerenzer (eds), Experts in Science and Society, New York: 
Kluwer, 2004, pp. 85−103, at pp. 91−98.  
62  See Christoph Antons, ‘Foster v Mountford: Cultural Confidentiality in a Changing Australia’, in Andrew 
T. Kenyon, Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Landmarks in Australian Intellectual Property Law, 
New York: Cambride University Press, 2009, pp. 110−125, at p. 121. Neowarra, one of the biggest native title 
cases of the Australian history, may serve as an illustration. Here, testimonials of Aboriginal witnesses 
were sometimes used to complement expert opinions provided by anthropologists. See, e.g. Neowarra v 
Western Australia (2003) FCA 1402, at para. 25 Sundberg J. What is more, with regard to determining the 
significance of Wanjina and Wungurr for Aboriginal culture, Justice Sundberg made extensive use of 
Aboriginal expertise (ibid., at paras 164–185). For detailed information on this case see Graber, ‘Aboriginal 
Self-Determination’, supra note 22. 
63  Gary Edmond, ‘Thick Decisions: Expertise, Advocacy and Reasonableness in the Federal Court of 
Australia’ (2004) Oceania, 74, pp. 190−230, at p. 220. 
64  On NAGPRA see Goldberg, supra note 25. 
65  See Karolina Kuprecht, ‘The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Potentials and Limits for 
International Cultural Property Law’, University of Lucerne, Switzerland, i-call Working Paper No. 3 (2011), 
at pp. 10-13, available online at http://www.unilu.ch/files/i-
call_working_paper_2011_09_kuprecht_cultural_affiliation_in_nagpra.pdf. 
66  For more information see Graber, ‘Modern Law and CEs’, supra note 39, at pp. 168-169. 
CHRISTOPH B. GRABER                                                                                                                                                                                               15 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
have been “inspired” by traditional cultural knowledge. The indigenous group, 
however, may claim that the individual artist in producing the artwork was making 
use of indigenous cultural knowledge that is controlled by the group.67  
For a conflict rule in this case I suggest relying on the UNDRIP, protecting the 
right of an indigenous group to live according to its cultural practices, as provided 
by the right of self-government. With regard to collisions between group rights and 
rights of individual members of the group, Article 34 UNDRIP states that, as a rule, 
universally respected individual human rights prevail. Consequently, a weighting of 
conflicting group rights and individual rights will be necessary on a case-by-case 
basis and considering the weight of the human rights involved. As a first step in the 
resolution of such a dispute, I suggest (for the reasons outlined in section 3.3, below) 
a procedure of national law providing for a presumption that the TK or TCE at issue 
is controlled by the indigenous group, according to indigenous laws and customs. 
Indigenous control would imply that the group would have the right to determine 
who is authorised to “speak” for the group.68 Accordingly, an individual person 
challenging the application of indigenous laws and customs would have to carry the 
burden of proof to show that modern IP law applies. Rebutting the presumption of 
indigenous ownership/control will be very difficult since the individual claimant 
would basically have to demonstrate that the knowledge assets at issue – with the 
approval of the indigenous community – left the “jurisdiction” of indigenous laws 
and customs and entered the jurisdiction of modern law. If such a dispute cannot be 
resolved amicably, then it should be decided by a specialised court, arbitral tribunal 
or other judicial authority that is in equal parts composed of indigenous and non-
indigenous members.69  
The establishment of institutions capable of assuring legal certainty is a precept 
for a licit market in TK and TCE to build up. Consequently, rules providing an 
interface between indigenous custom and modern law will be crucial. This is again a 
problem to be resolved primarily at the national level and interface rules will depend 
on the properties of the knowledge asset traded. With regard to specific IP aspects of 
indigenous knowledge and culture, procedures regulating the interplay between 
modern law and traditional custom exist in New Zealand. These rules are designed 
to resolving conflicts of trade mark registration. According to the New Zealand 
Trade Marks Act, trade marks that are offensive to Māori must not be registered.70 In 
cases of doubt as to whether a trade mark actually causes offence, the Commissioner 
of Trade Marks seeks advice from a specially created Māori Advisory Committee.71 
According to Susy Frankel, “the Commissioner has not differed from the 
Committee’s advice” to date. However, such a difference would be possible if the 
applicant for the trade mark “submits contrary advice from a different group of 
Māori”.72  
                                                        
67  For examples see Peter Shand, ‘Scenes from the Colonial Catwalk: Cultural Appropriation, Intellectual 
Property Rights, and Fashion’ (2002) Cultural Analysis, 3, pp. 47-88. 
68  Ibid., at p. 64. 
69  If the indigenous community wins, then it would be up to it to decide on the basis of its laws and customs 
whether the TK or TCE can be traded and under what conditions ownership can be transferred to third 
parties. If the individual claimant wins, then he or she will be free to trade the knowledge asset according 
to the rules of modern IP and/or property law. 
70  See Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 17(b)(ii). 
71  Section 177 of the Trade Marks Act requires the Commissioner of Trade Marks to appoint an advisory 
committee to advise the Commissioner whether the registration of a trademark that is, or appears to be, 
derivative of Māori text and imagery is likely to be offensive to Māori. See 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____1291.aspx. 
72  Frankel, ‘TMs, TK and CIP’, supra note 38, at pp. 450-451. 
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With regard to the third type of disputes, i.e. disputes between (two or more) 
indigenous communities concerning control of indigenous knowledge assets, one 
could again learn from procedures existing under NAGPRA combining the concept 
of cultural affiliation with requirements of transparency and notification. The factual 
context of the NAGPRA procedure of interest is a request by an indigenous group for 
repatriation of human remains and cultural items that is addressed at a museum 
currently possessing the claimed objects. The request is likely to be triggered by the 
museum’s notification of an inventory in the US Federal Register73 or by a written 
summary of objects communicated to tribes that could be culturally affiliated.74 The 
purpose of the inventory or summary is to provide information on the Native 
American human remains and cultural items in the museums possession. Based on 
consultation with native representatives, cultural affiliation of the claimant will then 
be evaluated. If the request for repatriation is contested by another indigenous group, 
claiming to have a better right in the object, then NAGPRA provides that the 
indigenous groups must resolve the dispute among themselves.75 As long as the 
conflict is not resolved, the claimed object remains in the custody of the museum.76 
 
3.3 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The examples of native title in Australian case law and NAGPRA in the United 
States show that it would not make sense to develop a one-size-fits-all solution at the 
international level to resolving disputes on the allocation of indigenous ownership. 
Indeed, the UNDRIP recognises in its preamble “that the situation of indigenous 
peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and 
cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration”. 77  Accordingly, with 
regard to dispute settlement, the best way to take account of this plurality of 
indigenous cultures would probably be procedures to be agreed on at national level – 
possibly in a treaty concluded between the respective indigenous peoples and the 
state of which they are part – or in an instrument of secondary law. The concept of 
cultural affiliation, as applied under NAGPRA, shows that it is very well possible to 
work out procedures showing respect for the particularities of indigenous forms of 
social organisation and compensating for the difficulties indigenous claimants face 
when required to prove ownership while still providing for legal certainty. What 
would be necessary at the level of international law would be some kind of interface 
rule stating who is responsible to resolve problems related to defining “indigenous 
peoples”, “TK” and “TCE”. Moreover, the codification of some guiding principles for 
the protection of TK and TCE would be necessary at the international level, including 
mutual recognition of national standards, FPIC, access and benefit-sharing and the 
                                                        
73  This requirement applies to museums and similar agencies that are federally funded; see NAGPRA of 1990, 
25 U.S.C. § 3003(d). 
74  NAGPRA of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3004(a). 
75  NAGPRA of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C and D), see Kuprecht, supra note 65, at p. 18. 
76  For more detailed information on these NAGPRA procedures see James A. R. Nafziger et al., Cultural Law: 
International, Comparative, and Indigenous, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, at 
pp. 427-429. 
77  UNDRIP, supra note 21, recital 23. 
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obligation of states to protect TK and TCE against misappropriation.78 These are all 
issues where human rights concerns overlap with interests of protecting indigenous 
peoples’ knowledge assets. It is thus an open question (going beyond the scope of 
this chapter) whether these issues should be addressed in a treaty on TK and TCE or, 
e.g., in a binding international convention on the rights of indigenous peoples. 
New Zealand seems to be one of the pioneer users of procedural approaches in 
areas of trade in traditional knowledge. It is interesting to note, that New Zealand 
relies on a procedural approach not only when interfacing intellectual property and 
traditional knowledge protection but also when reserving traditional rights of Māori 
in its free trade agreements.79 The situation in New Zealand is, however, unique 
because the Treaty of Waitangi, concluded between the Māori and the British Crown 
in 1840, not only provides the Māori with strong rights in their traditional knowledge 
and “treasures”,80 but generally permits Māori to negotiate on par with the New 
Zealand government. To be sure, one should not  idealise the situation in New 
Zealand, as the government is nevertheless a political body, accountable to the 
general population. Hence, it is liable to oppose Māori interests in seeking to balance 
Māori demands against the greater good for New Zealand, even if the Māori 
perceive that the interests are protected by the Treaty. 
4. INDIGENOUS CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW  
In the previous sections of this chapter, I found that participation of indigenous 
peoples is the solution to many problems of legitimacy in trade and development of 
ICH. Based on this insight, I proposed a procedural method to cope with differences 
between indigenous and modern worldviews that complicate the implementation of 
rules for legitimate trade in a modern legal context. In the remainder of the chapter I 
will study the potential of international law and policymaking to better stimulate 
trade and development in ICH. To this end, I will first briefly assess the current 
status of indigenous culture and development in international economic law and 
policymaking. When doing this, activities sponsored by a number of 
intergovernmental organisations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)81 and the Convention 
                                                        
78  See Peter Drahos, ‘A Networked Responsive Regulatory Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge’, 
in Daniel J. Gervais (ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development. Strategies to Optimize Economic 
Development in a TRIPS-plus Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 385–415, at pp. 396-401. 
79  For more information see Susy Frankel, ‘A New Zealand Perspective on the Protection of Mātauranga 
Māori (Traditional Knowledge)’, in this volume. 
80  Treaty of Waitangi, Article 2. The Māori version of the Treaty uses the term “taonga”, which extends to 
both the tangible and intangible. See Frankel, ibid., and Jessica C. Lai, ‘Māori Culture in the Modern World: 
Its Creation, Appropriation and Trade’, University of Lucerne, Switzerland, i-call Working Paper No. 2 
(2010), at pp. 17-19, available online at 
http://www.unilu.ch/files/icall_working_paper_2011_02_lai_maori_cultural_heritage__undrip.pdf. 
81  For the purpose of this chapter, I consider the most relevant activities of UNESCO (particularly those in the 
field of protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions) as belonging to international 
economic law. As a justification it is sufficient to refer to UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity 
(CCD) recognising in its Article 1(g) (and in recital 18 of the Preamble) that cultural products have a dual 
nature that includes also an economic relevance as goods or services. Indeed, the CCD plays an important 
role in the regulation of trade and culture at the international, regional and national levels. UNESCO, 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 1440 UNTS 311 
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on Biological Diversity (CBD), stand at the foreground. With the exception of 
UNESCO, most of these activities are IP-centred. In the following section 5, I will 
then explore an alternative avenue to promote trade and development in ICH that 
would go beyond IP-centred approaches. 
4.1 WTO/TRIPS 
In the WTO, development as an end of trade liberalisation is prominently 
anchored in the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO82 and 
in several declarations emanating from Ministerial conferences. Moreover, 
discussions on special and differential treatment of developing countries are taking 
place in the Committee on Trade and Development, one of the WTO’s regular bodies 
where all Members are represented. Since the WTO is a state-centred organisation, 
these considerations relate to developing countries. Developmental interests of 
indigenous peoples, however, are not independently mentioned and there is no 
language in the covered agreements of the WTO directly addressing indigenous 
issues.83 Whereas the interests of certain developing countries may overlap with the 
interests of their indigenous population to some extent, this has often not been the 
case for indigenous peoples of industrialised countries such as the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
While the TRIPs Agreement84 of the WTO is without question the most important 
legal instrument regulating trade in creative expression and innovation, it is a matter 
of debate whether TK and TCE are covered by its disciplines.85 A general feeling that 
numerous modes of TK and TCE remain outside the scope of IP protection led the 
Doha Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 2001 to explicitly instruct the TRIPS 
Council, 86  in paragraph 19, to examine, inter alia, “the protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore”. 87  In 2005, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 
reaffirmed the mandate for the TRIPS Council in paragraph 44 of its Declaration.88 
On the one hand, both Ministerial Declarations thereby formalised the TRIPS 
                                                                                                                                                       
(adopted on 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007). See Christoph B. Graber, ‘Trade and 
Culture’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010,  available online at 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1987&recno=1&searchType=Quick&query=Christoph+Beat+Graber [hereinafter Graber, ‘Trade and 
Culture’]. 
82  WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 UNTS 154 (adopted on 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
83  See also Macmillan, supra note 14, in this volume. 
84  WTO, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 (adopted on 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
85  Graber, ‘Institutionalization of Creativity’, supra note 36, at pp. 241-242. 
86  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council) is one of the three 
sectoral Councils operating under the General Council. It is the body, open to all Members of the WTO, 
responsible for the administration of the TRIPS Agreement and in particular for monitoring the operation 
of the Agreement. 
87  WTO, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’, (WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 2001), adopted 14 November 2001 
at Doha, Qatar [hereinafter ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’].  
88  WTO, ‘Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration’, (WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 2005), adopted on 18 December 
2005. Paragraph 44 reads as follows: “We take note of the work undertaken by the Council for TRIPS 
pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and agree that this work shall continue on 
the basis of paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the progress made in the Council for 
TRIPS to date. The General Council shall report on its work in this regard to our next Session.” 
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Council’s work programme, which had started a few years before the first 
Declaration in the context of the review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.89 
Article 27.3(b) provides exceptions to the general rule that patents are to be available 
for any inventions. It relates to the issue of TK in as far as it contains the exception 
that allows countries to exclude certain types of inventions from patenting, i.e. plants, 
animals and “essentially” biological processes. On the other hand, the Ministerial 
Declarations did not limit the examination to the questions relating to TK (and its 
patentability), but added to the TRIPS Council’s mandate the examination of the 
protection of “folklore”, which tends to be examined more through the lens of 
copyright. Most statements made in the TRIPS Council have related to TK and 
relatively little has been said with respect to TCE or folklore.90  
One of the key focuses of the discussion has been the relation of the TRIPS 
Agreement with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; 91  see section 4.4, 
below).92 Since 2003, the work on this point has also been undertaken outside the 
work programme of the TRIPS Council as part of a consultative process carried out 
by the Director-General of the WTO. His report of 9 June 200893 was fed into the July 
2008 ministerial meeting, but there was no outcome to this meeting. The fact that TK 
and TCE became at all an issue of WTO law is mainly a result of developing 
countries entering the fora where international IPRs are being discussed and 
negotiated. 94  According to Gervais, this has also led to a more or less direct 
representation of indigenous peoples’ interests at an international level.95 However, 
this is true only for few countries, including Bolivia96 and Venezuela. Beyond that, 
however, the WTO is not an organisation where indigenous interests are well 
represented. 
4.2 WIPO 
WIPO’s response to the non-existent international protection of indigenous 
knowledge assets was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee on 
                                                        
89  Hannu Wager, ‘Biodiversity, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Work on Related IP Matters in the 
WTO’ (2008) Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, 3, pp. 215–227, at p. 218. 
90  WTO, TRIPS Council Secretariat, ‘The Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Summary of 
Issues Raised and Points Made’, (WTO Doc. IP/C/W/370/Rev.1, 2006), at p. 2. 
91  Rio Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio Convention), 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (opened for signature 
5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993). 
92  Martin A. Girsberger, ‘Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: A Policy Perspective’, in 
Christoph B. Graber and Mira Burri-Nenova (eds), Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions 
in a Digital Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 123–149, at p. 134. 
93  WTO, General Council Trade Negotiations Committee, Report by the Director-General, ‘Issues Related to 
the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS 
Agreement to Products other than Wines and Spirits and those Related to the Relationship Between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity’, (WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/591 – TN/C/W/50, 
2008). 
94  According to Gervais “[t]he participation of these countries is essential to ensure that intellectual property 
norms are understood by all and updated in ways that reflect the concerns of all nations at the tables to 
negotiate.” Daniel J. Gervais, ‘The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the 
Very Old and the Very New’ (2002) Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 12, pp. 
929–990, at p. 941. 
95  Ibid., at p. 956. 
96  Bolivia’s representative stated in the TRIPS Council that Bolivia perceives TK and folklore (or TCE) as 
being part of one single, holistic cultural tradition, and thereby rejects the pure IP perspective realised in 
the TRIPS Agreement. See, e.g. WTO, ‘Minutes of the Meeting on 17 June 2008 of the TRIPS Council’, 
(WTO Doc. IP/C/M/5, 2008). 
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Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC) in 2001. Although the discussions in the WIPO IGC on sui generis instruments 
to protect TK, TCE and genetic resources have been on-going for more than ten years, 
relatively little progress has been made. After 19 sessions, the IGC has reached the 
stage of text-based negotiations, but no agreement is in view even with regard to the 
key objectives and principles of the new TCE and TK instruments and views diverge 
between indigenous and non-indigenous stakeholders and often even between 
indigenous communities.97 For indigenous peoples, one central question is whether 
the new instruments should also extend to TCE and TK of a non-indigenous origin.  
The idea of “development” is strongly present in the texts drafted by the IGC.98 
With the launch of its Development Agenda 2007, WIPO generally started to look at 
IP from a development perspective.99 The purpose of this broader view is to confront 
the vast social effects of IP law beyond creating incentives for innovation and 
maximising revenues. The scope of the WIPO Development Agenda includes 
knowledge assets of indigenous peoples in developing and developed countries.  
4.3 UNESCO 
Strengthening the contribution of culture to sustainable development has been a 
goal of UNESCO policymaking since the launch of the World Decade for Cultural 
Development (1988-1998). With regard to its activities with indigenous peoples, 
UNESCO stresses that it is “framed by its missions to protect and promote cultural 
diversity, encourage intercultural dialogue and enhance linkages between culture 
and development”.100 Notwithstanding these euphonious promises, UNESCO’s most 
relevant standard-setting instrument in this context, the Convention on Cultural 
Diversity (CCD), 101  does not respond sufficiently to the interests of indigenous 
peoples.102 The failure to properly protect cultural interests of indigenous peoples can 
                                                        
97  For more information see Christoph Antons, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: 
Basic Concepts and Continuing Controversies’, in this volume; and Girsberger and Müller, supra note 3. 
98  In the Draft on TCE, to this end two objectives are relevant: objective (iii), which aims to “contribute to the 
welfare and sustainable economic, cultural, environmental and social development of such peoples and 
communities”; and objective (xii), which aims to promote the development of indigenous peoples and 
communities and “legitimate trading activities”. Objective (xii) promotes the use of TCE for the 
development of indigenous peoples and communities, where desired by them. Moreover, the objective 
recognises the TCE as “an asset of the communities that identify with them, such as through the 
development and expansion of marketing opportunities for tradition-based creations and innovations”. 
WIPO, IGC, Secretariat, ‘The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions’, Nineteenth Session (WIPO 
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/19/4, 2011). 
99  The WIPO Development Agenda was established by the WIPO General Assembly in October 2007. It 
includes a set of 45 recommendations designed to enhance the development dimension of the 
organisation’s activities. Recommendation 18 (related to norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public 
domain) urges the IGC “to accelerate the process on the protection of genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge and folklore, without prejudice to any outcome, including the possible development of an 
international instrument or instruments.” In addition to the adoption of the Development Agenda, WIPO 
Member States also approved a recommendation to establish a Committee on Development and 
Intellectual Property. See generally the chapters in Neil W. Netanel (ed.), The Development Agenda. Global 
Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
100  See http://www.unesco.org/en/cultural-diversity/action-in-favour-of-cultural-diversity/unesco-and-
indigenous-peoples-partnership-for-cultural-diversity/ . 
101  Supra note 81. 
102  For a comprehensive assessment of further UNESCO instruments relevant for ICH, including the 1972 
World Cultural Heritage Convention and the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage, see the chapter of Coombe and Turcotte, supra note 3. See also Francesco Bandarin, 
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be explained by the drafting history of the CCD. The convention was designed by its 
drafters to protect national entertainment industries rather than creative expressions 
of indigenous peoples.103 Indeed, a reference to TCE and indigenous peoples was 
introduced only at a late stage of the negotiations.104 Although the adopted text does 
mention TCE and indigenous peoples a few times,105 the relevant provisions do not 
address the rights of the indigenous peoples themselves but those of the states whose 
territory is affected.106 Similarly, the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding 
of Intangible Cultural Heritage 107  is not considered by indigenous peoples to 
adequately furthering their interests.108 
4.4 CBD 
Over the last decades, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 109  has 
gained prominence as forum for discussing issues of traditional knowledge. 
Although the CBD focuses on TK that is associated with genetic resources, 
discussions on disclosure or certification of origin held therein may also be relevant 
for other forms of TK relating to the subject matter of intellectual property 
applications. With regard to access to and benefit-sharing of knowledge that is held 
by indigenous peoples, the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol by the CBD Conference 
of Parties in October 2010 is most important.110 Its Article 7 requires parties to ensure 
that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that is held by 
indigenous and local communities is accessed with the free prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) of these communities, and that mutually agreed terms have been 
established.111 It thus satisfies requirements of indigenous participation in any legal 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: Comments from UNESCO in Light of its 
International Standard-Setting Instruments in the Field of Culture’, in this volume. 
103  See Federico Lenzerini, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy Over Commercial Use of 
their Traditional Knowledge’, in Francesco Francioni and Martin Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights, 
Leiden et al.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, pp. 119–149, at p. 130. 
104  See Christoph B. Graber, ‘Traditional Cultural Expressions in a Matrix of Copyright, Cultural Diversity 
and Human Rights’, in Fiona Macmillan (ed.), New Directions in Copyright Law, vol. V, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2007, pp. 45–71, at pp. 54–55. 
105  Paragraph 8 of the preamble recognises, “the importance of traditional knowledge”. Furthermore, 
paragraph 13 of the preamble recognizes that diversity of cultural expressions, including “traditional 
cultural expressions”, is an important factor that allows peoples and individuals to express and to share 
with others their ideas and values. Finally, paragraph 15 of the preamble, Article 2 (principle 3) and Article 
7.1(a) refer to the relevance of the CCD for persons belonging to indigenous peoples. 
106  Graber, ‘Trade and Culture’, supra note 81, at para. 22; Mira Burri-Nenova et al., ‘The Protection and 
Promotion of Cultural Diversity in a Digital Networked Environment: Mapping Possible Advances to 
Coherence’, in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade 
Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 
pp. 359–393, at pp. 368-369. 
107  UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2368 UNTS 1 (adopted on 
17 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006) 
108  As Coombe and Turcotte, supra note 3, highlight, indigenous peoples were not involved in the drafting of 
the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. This explains many of the 
identified shortcomings of this instrument and questions its legitimacy to further the interests of 
indigenous peoples. See also Bandarin, supra note 102. 
109  Supra note 91. 
110  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1) 
(adopted on 19 October 2010). For a more comprehensive assessment of the Nagoya Protocol and its 
relationship with the CBD see Scott and Lenzerini, supra note 56. 
111  The Nagoya Protocol is open for signatures until 1 February 2012. 
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or political process involving their traditional knowledge, as outlined above (sections 
2  and 3.2). Furthermore, Article 5 of the Protocol provides for the need to ensure that 
benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources are shared in a fair and equitable way with indigenous peoples, in 
accordance with domestic regulation. Reflecting the institutionalisation of access and 
benefit-sharing rights of indigenous peoples in Articles 7 and 5, Scott and Lenzerini 
predict in their contribution to this volume that the Nagoya Protocol will potentially 
play an important role in future discussions on the regulation of trade in ICH.112 
4.5 SUMMARY 
To summarise, it appears that the interrelationship between cultural knowledge, 
trade and development has entered the thinking of the most important fora of 
international economic law. The above assessment of activities in WTO/TRIPS, WIPO, 
UNESCO and CBD is confirmed in the broader context of the UN in general by the 
2008 UN Creative Economy Report.113 This report was drafted by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in cooperation with UNESCO, WIPO and the 
International Trade Centre (ITC). It emphasised the link between the economy and 
culture as a “new development paradigm” and chapter 6.4 explicitly deals with TCE. 
The new trend goes hand in hand with dynamics in the UN General Assembly, 
which, on 19 December 2010, adopted a resolution on culture and development as a 
follow-up to the 2010 UN Millennium Summit.114 This resolution emphasises the 
important contribution of culture for sustainable development and for the 
achievement of national and international development objectives, including the 
Millennium Development Goals.115 This resolution is of particular relevance, since 
the eight Millennium Development Goals do not mention culture explicitly. 
To be sure, these noble words remain merely programmatic and not much has 
been undertaken to effectively improve the status of indigenous peoples and 
independently address their interests in the realm of culture, trade and development. 
Often, indigenous interests and interests of developing countries have been 
mentioned in the same breath. However, as recent discussions show, indigenous 
peoples have interests that are distinct from interests of developing countries. 116 
International law, which is generally state-centred, does not seem to be prepared to 
recognise indigenous peoples’ international juridical personality beyond declaratory 
texts. Although some international fora have intensified their efforts to facilitate 
                                                        
112  Scott and Lenzerini, supra note 56. 
113  According to the United Nations Creative Economy Report 2008 “a new development paradigm is 
emerging that links the economy and culture, embracing economic, cultural, technological and social 
aspects of development at both the macro and micro levels. Central to the new paradigm is the fact that 
creativity, knowledge and access to information are increasingly recognized as powerful engines driving 
economic growth and promoting development in a globalizing world.” UN, UNCTAD, United Nations 
Creative Economy Report 2008, ‘The Challenge of Assessing the Creative Economy: Towards Informed 
Policy-making’, (UN Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/2008/2, 2008), at p. 3. 
114  See UNESCO, Executive Office, Sector for Culture, ‘The United Nations Recognizes the Role of Culture for 
Development’ (23 December 2010), available  at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=41466&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (11.7.2011). 
115  See UN, United Nations Development Programme, ‘What are the Millennium Development Goals?’, 
available  at http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml. 
116  For examples see, e.g. Drahos, supra note 78, at p. 394. 
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indigenous participation,117 the holders of TK and TCE face insurmountable obstacles 
in finding the necessary means and capacity to effectively playing a part in the 
relevant discussions and negotiations.118 It also seems doubtful whether any of the 
mentioned instruments under negotiation, could – if eventually entered in force – be 
successfully implemented in states where indigenous rights of self-government in 
cultural matters are not recognised. What is more, the on-going discussions on 
creating new WIPO instruments on TCE and TK are not sufficiently coordinated with 
concurring debates in the TRIPS council and/or in the CBD. The relevant activities of 
these fora as well as of UNESCO are determined by the respective organisation’s 
specialisation and there is a risk that eventual outcomes will increase rather than 
reduce the existing fragmentation of the relevant law on ICH. These difficulties have 
provoked critical comments generally questioning the viability of top-down 
solutions  to the problem.119 
5. PROS AND CONS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE RULES FOR 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES STIMULATING A MORE ACTIVE 
ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GLOBAL TRADE 
The analysis in the above section revealed that international economic law in its 
current shape does not sufficiently respond to indigenous interests in the trade and 
development of their cultural heritage. Whereas intellectual property aspects of 
international economic law were at the foreground so far, I would now like to 
discuss the viability of an alternative option. The question to be studied is whether 
preferential trade rules for indigenous cultural goods and services would be a means 
to stimulating a more active role of indigenous peoples in global trade. Whereas 
preferential treatment in trade relations is already an important issue of international 
trade regulation, it has hardly been discussed whether such rules could also be 
drafted for indigenous peoples. The basis for the following appreciation is an earlier 
paper published elsewhere,120 where I suggested studying the possibility of creating 
preferential rules for goods and services of indigenous origin in a WTO context and 
outlined a possible pathway to this end. The document was discussed as a reference 
paper in the expert workshop121 from which this book results. The following is a 
restatement of the original ideas and reflects what I learned from the many 
interesting comments that were expressed by a number of colleagues at that occasion. 
As outlined, the WTO views the promotion of economic development being one 
of the primary aims of international trade 122  and the preamble of the WTO 
                                                        
117  In 2004, the Conference of Parties of the CBD established a Voluntary Trust Fund to facilitate the 
participation of indigenous and local communities in the work of the convention. See UN and UNEP, 
‘Voluntary Fund’, available at http://www.cbd.int/traditional/fund.shtml. Similarly, WIPO Members set up 
a Voluntary Fund in 2005 to facilitate the participation of accredited indigenous and Local Communities in 
the sessions of the IGC. See WIPO, ‘Voluntary Fund’, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ngoparticipation/voluntary_fund/. 
118  See Kathy Bowrey, ‘International Trade in Indigenous Culture Heritage: Legal and Policy Issues. An 
Australian Perspective’, in this volume; Martin Girsberger and Benny Müller, supra note 3; and Drahos, 
supra note 78, at p. 400. 
119  See Drahos, supra note 78, at pp. 414-415. 
120  Graber, ‘Institutionalization of Creativity’, supra note 36. 
121  The exploratory workshop on ‘International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage’ took place in Lucerne 
from 17-19 January 2011. It was organised by i-call, the research centre for international communications 
and art law, at the school of law of the University of Lucerne. 
122  See WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 87, particularly at para. 2. 
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Agreement recognises the “need for positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries … secure a share in the growth of international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development”.123 In this spirit, the 
WTO legal framework contains a number of rules providing for special and 
differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries, including for example, longer 
transitional time periods, special rules on dispute settlement, flexibility of 
commitments or technical assistance.124 Moreover, the WTO provides for a General 
System of Preferences (GSP) exception. As GSPs are used by WTO developed-
country Members to increase the share of developing-country Members in 
international trade, an exception from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligation of 
Article 1 GATT 125  is indeed necessary to avoid an inconsistency with existing 
multilateral obligations.  
As Gregory Shaffer and Yvonne Apea have emphasised, it is necessary to 
understand the raison d'être and the functioning of GSPs within a historical context of 
colonialism. In 1947, when the GATT was signed, many signatories of the agreement 
still had colonies. 126  To make sure that the trade preferences granted by the 
colonising GATT members to their colonies would not become GATT inconsistent, 
Article I:2 GATT provided for so-called “colonial” or “imperial” preferences. In the 
period of decolonisation, the former colonies sought to join forces in a group of 
developing countries and in 1964 UNCTAD was established as a “counterpart to 
GATT that would focus on development priorities.”127 At UNCTAD I in 1964, a 
report was adopted to promote the idea of trade preferences for developing countries 
in the form of lower tariffs.128 Since this was inconsistent with the MFN disciplines of 
the GATT, a waiver for a Generalised System of Preferences favouring trade of less 
developed countries was granted in 1971 for a ten year period.129 Shortly before the 
GSP waiver expired, GATT Members took a decision in 1979 to permanently 
authorise the GSP programmes.130 This decision that became known as the “Enabling 
Clause” was incorporated into GATT 1994.131 
As John Jackson pointed out, there was no legal obligation for developed 
countries to grant GSP programmes and “no particularly detailed requirements as to 
                                                        
123  See Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 82, Preamble, recital 2. 
124  For an overview see Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 2nd edn, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, at p. 723-724. 
125  WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187; 33 ILM 1153 (adopted on 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995). 
126  Gregory Shaffer and Yvonne Apea, ‘GSP Programmes and Their Historical-Political-Institutional Context: 
Comment on Lorand Bartels’, in Thomas Cottier et al. (eds), Human Rights and International Trade, Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 488–503, at p. 492. 
127  Ibid., at p. 493. 
128  John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, at p. 322. 
129  GATT Secretariat, Waiver, ‘The Generalized System of Preferences’, (GATT Document BISD 18S/24, 25 
June 1971). 
130  GATT, ‘Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries’, (GATT Doc. L/4903, 1979). Lorand Bartels, ‘Conditionality in GSP Programmes: The Appellate 
Body Report in European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries and its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programmes’, in Thomas Cottier et al. (eds), 
Human Rights and International Trade, International Economic Law Series, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 463–487, at p. 464. 
131  For more information see Bernard Hoekman, ‘More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries: Ways 
Forward’, in Richard Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha, and Development: Window Into the Issues, Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2006, pp. 213–221; Seung W. Chang, ‘WTO for Trade and Development Post-Doha’ (2007) 
Journal of International Economic Law, 10 (3), pp. 553–570; Van den Bossche, supra note 124, at pp. 728–731. 
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what should be the shape and framework of GSP”. 132  As a consequence, GSP 
programmes were implemented by major industrialised countries at different times 
and with varying features.133 Considering the rather fuzzy normative contour and 
multiple functionality of GSP programmes, it seems tempting to explore whether 
such programmes could extend to trade preferences for cultural goods (or services) 
of indigenous origin.134  
To foreclose the results of my exploration that – as mentioned above – was 
guided by many insightful comments of a number of colleagues, such an endeavour 
would be burdened by several flaws. The first flaw is related to the conditionality of 
GSP programmes in general. “GSP conditionality” is a shortcut formula used to 
describe that GSP programmes, as a rule, provide trade preferences to developing 
countries under certain conditions only. The EU and the US – being the major WTO 
Members to run a GSP programme – provide for numerous conditions to the 
granting of tariff preferences.135 The open-ended scope of GSP conditionality in the 
EU’s programme was exposed in European Communities – Tariff Preferences.136 The EU 
GSP under scrutiny in that case provided for additional preferences that were 
granted to countries participating in a programme to combat drug production and 
trafficking. The standard of drug combat measures was apparently applied very 
broadly, since the European Commission found that Pakistan would meet the 
requirements of the scheme because of the countries’ “changed position on the 
Taliban regime and its determination to return to democratic rule”.137 Whereas the 
EU GSP provides conditions that a developing country must meet in order to be 
granted the additional preferences, the US follows a “negative” approach to GSP 
conditionality.138 There is a great variety of criteria that would reduce the chances of 
a developing country to benefit from the US GSP including, for example, 
communism, violation of workers’ rights or child labour, or even insufficient 
standards of IP protection.139  
Judgements in the academic literature regarding the pros and cons of GSP 
conditionality are divided. Whereas some scholars acknowledge the potential of 
carefully drafted conditions “to advance the cause of human rights”,140 or to promote 
social goals,141 others point to neo-colonial strands in their texture and to playing on 
asymmetric power relations in international trade. Philip Alston criticised the fuzzy 
scope of GSP programmes, offering the US and the EC a carte blanche to opt for 
                                                        
132  Jackson, supra note 128, at p. 323. 
133  According to UNCTAD, the following countries are currently providing GSP programmes: Australia, 
Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the United States. See UNCTAD, ‘Generalized System of Preferences’, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1418&lang=1. 
134  See Graber, ‘Institutionalization of Creativity’, supra note 36, at pp. 246-248, where I have indeed 
suggested to explore GSP conditionality as a means to promote indigenous peoples’ participation in trade 
with cultural heritage assets. 
135  19 U.S.C. 2462. See Barnali Choudhury et al., ‘A Call for a WTO Ministerial Decision on Trade and Human 
Rights’, in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: 
From Fragmentation to Coherence, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 323–358 
at 337-338. 
136  WTO, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004. 
137  EU Commission, ‘Briefing on 12 March 2002’, as quoted by Bartels, supra note 130, at p. 467. 
138  Shaffer and Apea, supra note 126, at p. 494. 
139  On the US GSP see Bartels, supra note 130, at p. 467; Choudhury et al., supra note 135, at p. 337. 
140  Choudhury et al., supra note 135, at p. 336. 
141  For a discussion see Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Social Regulation in the WTO: Trade Policy and 
International Legal Development, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010, at pp. 246-259. 
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“whatever standards they chose in a given situation”. 142 Peter Drahos and John 
Braithwaite denounced the US as having used GSP conditionality in a carrot and 
stick manner since the first amendment of the GSP in 1984 for the purpose of 
implementing higher standards of IP protection in beneficiary countries.143 Shaffer 
and Apea similarly found fault with the United States’ use of GSP conditionality “as 
‘a key lever’ to press recalcitrant developing countries to agree to the inclusion of the 
TRIPS Agreement into the new WTO system in 1995”.144 
The second and main flaw is the state-centrism of GSP programmes. Since 
indigenous peoples are not recognised as legal subjects of international law, it would 
be difficult to “target” the benefits of a GSP programme at indigenous peoples. 
Accordingly, partners of a GSP programme would not be indigenous peoples 
themselves but the governments of the territories where they live. This would be 
problematic since the interests of indigenous peoples are often not identical (if not in 
conflict) with the interests of the country where they live.145 Would it be possible to 
absorb this deficiency by requiring the beneficiary country to assure participation of 
indigenous peoples in the drafting and administration of the GSP programme? One 
could think of referring to the UNDRIP and obliging a beneficiary country to endorse 
the Declaration and respect inter alia the therein provided standards of indigenous 
self-determination and self-government or FPIC in issues related to their cultural 
heritage.146 Such an approach does not seem excluded outright since the EU GSP 
provides for many references to human rights instruments. 147  According to the 
current EU GSP, a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance may be granted to a beneficiary country that has ratified and 
effectively implemented inter alia 16 human rights conventions.148 In addition, the 
beneficiary country is obliged to accept a regulatory monitoring of the instruments’ 
implementation as provided by the various conventions.149  
However, in the constellation of our research involving indigenous peoples of the 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, this would not seem realistic. Since GSP 
programmes are not meant to offer preferential treatment to rich countries, it is 
indeed difficult to imagine a country willing to extend its GSP to the United States, 
for example. 
To summarise, GSP programmes come at a high cost for the multilateral trading 
system. Although some commentators prize GSP as a means to further human rights, 
sceptical views prevail, criticising their fuzzy scope, and, because the allocation of 
benefits is frequently changed, risks of arbitrary application and a lack of legal 
certainty.150 Even more important in our context is that GSP programmes are of 
limited benefit for indigenous peoples since preferential treatment is always granted 
to countries and not to groups within a country. In context, a similar objection must 
be raised against trade preferences for cultural reasons as provided by the UNESCO 
                                                        
142  Philip Alston as quoted in Shaffer and Apea, supra note 126, at p. 497. 
143  Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, New York: 
New Press, 2003, at pp. 86-90 and 196-197. 
144  Shaffer and Apea, supra note 126, at p. 498. 
145  According to sources quoted in Drahos, supra note 78, at p. 393, indigenous peoples are the victims rather 
than the partners of national governments in many parts of the world. 
146  FPIC is a requirement provided in Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29 and 32 of UNDRIP. 
147  Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 (2008) Official Journal of the European Union, L 211/1, 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. 
See Choudhury et al., supra note 135, at p. 338. 
148  Ibid., Article 8(1)(a). 
149  Ibid., Article 8(1)(b). 
150  Shaffer and Apea, supra note 126, at p. 498. 
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CCD. Article 16 CCD provides that developed countries shall accord “preferential 
treatment to artists and other cultural professions and practitioners, as well as 
cultural goods and services from developing countries”. In contrast to most other 
provisions of the Convention, which are of a non-binding nature, Article 16 is a clear-
cut obligation.151 However, Article 16 CCD does not recognise the specific interests of 
indigenous peoples in developing as well as developed countries.152 This is due to 
the centrality of state sovereignty, which is a guiding principle underpinning the 
CCD.153 As a consequence, all rights and obligations stemming from the CCD are 
attributed to states. The UNESCO example confirms that the non-existence of 
indigenous peoples as subjects of international law is one of the major obstacles to 
any adequate protection of ICH at the international level.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter starts from the insight that a non-indigenous mind cannot access the 
worldviews of indigenous peoples. The (non-indigenous) legal scholar’s response to 
this epistemological relativism is to apply a procedural methodology in law and 
policymaking on ICH trade and development (participation of ICH holders) as well 
as in the process wherein these issues are scientifically reflected (participation of 
indigenous scholars). Opting for process-based solutions and participation would 
suggest preferring decentralised structures of decision-making to centralised ones. 
Similarly, the principle of subsidiarity requires that political matters should be handled 
at the lowest or least centralised level where an effective fulfilment of the task at 
issue is still possible. 154 Applying the principle of subsidiarity to deciding on the 
appropriate level of regulation in ICH trade and development would imply that 
definitions of “indigenous peoples”, “TK” and “TCE”, should be made at the 
national level – considering the above highlighted plurality of indigenous cultures 
around the world. Rules of international law, however, would be needed to 
guarantee a framework of minimal standards or to provide interface and 
coordination rules. With regard to minimal standards, international law should 
provide for obligations for states to respect a number of key principles, including 
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Article 2(2) as one of the eight guiding principles underpinning the Convention. 
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Isabel Feichtner, ‘Subsidiarity’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
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indigenous self-government, collective rights attribution, FPIC and access and 
benefit-sharing etc. With regard to coordination, commentators have convincingly 
argued for the principle of mutual recognition of national standards in preference to 
a national treatment requirement. 155  A question for further research would be 
whether minimal standards and interface rules should be established in the planned 
WIPO treaties on TK, TCE and genetic resources (GR) or rather in a future binding 
international instrument on indigenous rights. 
As the second part of the chapter revealed, international law’s potential for 
stimulating ICH trade and development is rather limited. Although the relevant fora 
of international economic law as well as the UN are aware of the linkage between 
ICH trade and development, so far few concrete effects have resulted from a 
remarkable production of soft and hard norms on TCE, TK and GR. I also had to 
learn that my original idea of using preferential trade rules as an instrument to 
further ICH trade and development does not withstand further examination. Besides 
much collateral damage to the multilateral trading order such a scheme would not be 
in the interest of indigenous peoples, mostly because of international law’s state-
centralism. Considering the many obstacles top-down solutions of international law 
are faced with, it makes sense to study bottom-up alternatives more closely, 
including the use of private certification standards to advance ICH trade and 
development.156 As the reader of this volume will note, several contributors have 
referred to such new approaches157 and the final chapter enters into this discussion in 
more depth. 158  Exploring international law’s potential to empower indigenous 
peoples developing autonomous local projects of ICH commercialisation would be 
an important contribution to further indigenous self-determination and self-
government in contexts of culture, trade and development. 
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